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The Wisdom of Dionysus: Metaphysics in the early and late 
Nietzsche, with particular respect to The Birth of Tragedy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
Introduction 
 
Although the problem of the relationship between Nietzsche and metaphysics 
might seem to be a settled issue, this is in fact a quite complicated and fascinating 
problematic. The difficulty with this subject lies in the often unacknowledged 
ambiguity that the term ‘metaphysics’ exhibits in Nietzsche's writing, as this word 
assumes different nuances and connotations in different contexts. Therefore, if we 
can get past the usual rhetoric on the topic, we come to realize that Nietzsche 
addresses the topic of metaphysics in at least two distinct ways.  
If we broadly understand metaphysics to be the inquiry concerning how reality 
is in itself, then we find in the work of Nietzsche two different levels of discourse 
regarding his opinion of metaphysics. On one level, we find the Nietzsche that we all 
know, the staunch opposer of metaphysics as Platonism who greatly influenced later 
thinkers such as Martin Heidegger and Jean-Luc Marion. However, on another level, 
there is a Nietzsche who is completely at ease in employing this term in a positive 
way. This, is particularly clear in the light of Nietzsche’s first publication, The Birth of 
Tragedy. Heavily influenced by figures such as Schopenhauer and Wagner, in this 
text Nietzsche avails himself of the term metaphysics as much in a positive as in a 
negative fashion. Moreover, the later ‘addenda’ to the book, that is, the preface to 
the second edition of The Birth of Tragedy and the remarks contained in Ecce Homo, 
allow us to trace some sort of continuity in Nietzsche's ambiguous attitude toward 
metaphysics between the early and the later stages of the development of his 
thought.  
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My argument is that that to assume an a priori opposition between 
Nietzschean philosophy and metaphysics is overly simplistic. On one hand, as 
evident in The Birth of Tragedy, at least in the early stages of his work Nietzsche 
was not specifically troubled by the idea of metaphysical investigation, namely the 
enquiry into the fundamental nature of reality.  Rather, he was worried about the 
blindness of his culture, precisely because of the latter's failure to perceive art 
instead of science or morality as the proper source of metaphysics, lacking as a 
result a proper metaphysical understanding of reality. In other words, in The Birth of 
Tragedy Nietzsche’s problem was not metaphysics as such, but rather the sort of 
metaphysics popular in his own times.  
On the other hand, in the later stages of his philosophical career Nietzsche 
employs the term metaphysics mostly implying a negative judgment of what this term 
represents. However, I hold that this has more to do with Nietzsche’s rebuttal of the 
influences of his youth along with some of their vocabulary, rather than with any shift 
in his thoughts or intentions. As I will argue, although Nietzsche came to refuse 
metaphysics as a term carrying any positive meaning, he still maintained the 
essence of the arguments we find in The Birth of Tragedy, and his later positions still 
find ground on what we might call a ‘good practice’ of metaphysics. 
            My essay will be divided into four sections and will develop as follows: in the 
first and second section, I shall analyze Nietzsche's understanding of metaphysics, 
in order to observe the positive employment of it in The Birth of Tragedy. To this 
effect, I shall explore this text’s connection to Nietzsche's key intellectual influences. 
First, I shall address the impact of the Schopenhauerian view of the world on The 
Birth of Tragedy, in particular as regards the opposition between Apollo and 
Dionysus and the nature and goal of tragic art. Subsequently, I shall refer to the 
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influence of Richard Wagner's thought in order to explore the relationship between 
metaphysics and art as humanity's "true metaphysical activity".  
In the third section, I shall consider how Nietzsche understands metaphysics 
in its varieties always to be the expression of an underlying existential attitude. In 
particular, I shall be focusing on the Socratic and the tragic way of life. By analyzing 
the opposition between these two attitudes toward existence I shall show how in 
addressing metaphysics Nietzsche is foremostly concerned with the values it may or 
may not convey, rather than with the question of its accuracy. Nietzsche condemns 
not metaphysics as morality because of its incorrectness, but because it promotes 
and grows out of the Socratic ethos. 
            In the fourth section, I shall examine the addenda to the original text of The 
Birth of Tragedy. Although Nietzsche refuses in part his opera prima, he recognizes 
it as containing the premises of his intellectual development. While metaphysics as a 
concept is employed by the mature Nietzsche mostly as indicating a negative, life-
denying dimension, the search for Dionysian wisdom is reaffirmed as the constant 
goal of Nietzsche’s philosophy both in its beginning and end. However, I argue that 
at the bottom this wisdom springs from the 'good' metaphysical knowledge of Will as 
the fundamental dimension of reality. Even if unnamed as such and understood 
under a somewhat different light, the essence of what constituted the artistic 
metaphysics promoted by The Birth of Tragedy survives in the late stages of 
Nietzsche’s work, reaffirmed under the banner of Dionysus. Accordingly, it is 
possible to claim that a certain practice and positive understanding of metaphysics 
remains present all across Nietzsche’s work. 
 
 5 
Which Metaphysics? (1) 
 
The goal of the first two sections is that of exploring Nietzsche's conception of 
metaphysics in The Birth of Tragedy, with an eye to the author's main intellectual 
influences. Famously, Nietzsche's first publication was influenced by a number of 
important figures belonging to the German cultural landscape and, unsurprisingly, 
the author's notion of metaphysics reflects the overall atmosphere of the text. In 
particular, we can trace the roots of Nietzsche’s understanding of the subject back to 
the massive influence of two authors: Arthur Schopenhauer and Richard Wagner. 
Both of these thinkers were hugely important for the young Nietzsche, and their 
ideas concurred in shaping what the latter means and understands by metaphysics.  
The first appearance of the word metaphysics in The Birth of Tragedy (BT 
from here on) comes in the introduction, which bears the title Foreword to Wagner. In 
dedicating the book to his mentor, Nietzsche claims art to be the ‘highest task’ and 
the 'real metaphysical activity of this [human] life'1. Nietzsche begins BT describing 
metaphysics as an activity, and as being expressed most properly in art. In other 
words, art is the means through which we should lead the inquiry into reality as it in 
itself. I shall wait the next section to thoroughly explore the Wagnerian background of 
Nietzsche’s first printed take on metaphysics. Before coming to that, I shall take a 
step back and instead examine Schopenhauer's role in this context. This is 
necessary, insofar as Schopenhauer was not only a major source of inspiration for 
Nietzsche but for Wagner as well, and they developed their understanding of art and 
metaphysics on the ground of and in contrast to Schopenhauer's positions. Thus, in 
order to fully appreciate how Nietzsche draws on Wagner in seeing art as a 
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metaphysical activity, first we have to understand how Schopenhauer’s thought 
helps Nietzsche setting the discussion in BT. 
The main aspect of Schopenhauer's philosophy at work in BT is the division 
between phenomena or representations on one hand, and noumena or Will on the 
other. Roughly speaking, this distinction amounts to say that we can understand the 
world in two fashions. On one hand, we can see it as populated by individuals and 
composite objects, namely representations. On the other hand though, we can 
perceive the in-itself of phenomena, realizing that they are nothing but illusions, the 
result of the fragmentation of a deeper reality. That in-itself is the Will, an inhuman, 
undivided force, which is continuingly striving for its own affirmation2.  
This latter concept is arguably the first formulation of what shall later be 
labeled ‘Will to Power’. In this regard, we must not be led into temptation and read 
this noumenal will as some sort of essence, or unconditioned safe ground underlying 
reality. In our exploration of reality, to see Will as the heart of reality is not a haven 
where we can find rest3. As Martin Heidegger argues, according to Nietzsche chaos 
is what defines the global character of reality. This does not imply the casting of a 
negative judgment on reality as chaotic. Rather, chaos is the immense yawning gap 
on which reality rests, a void that can be filled with all sorts of possibilities4. Hence, 
Will cannot be a haven as it rests on no safer ground than anything else, floating in 
chaos with all its expressions. However, to know Will as the kernel of all 
representations means to be able to know what drives the world, what keeps on 
filling the emptiness of chaos. 
 This, is the metaphysical framework on which Nietzsche develops his 
analysis of tragedy in BT. The famous duality of Apollo and Dionysus itself, while 
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already mentioned by Bachofen and Wagner5, is in this case an elaboration of 
Schopenhauer’s theories6, Accordingly, we find that Apollo is the symbol 
representing the Principium Individuationis, and thus the realms of singular and 
delineated objects7, By contrast, Dionysus embodies the Will, the god whose 
celebrations are the ‘[…] tearing asunder of the Principium Individuationis […]'8.  
One major aspect Nietzsche’s account of this distinction between the Will and 
representations  is the empirical fashion in which he these two dimensions. Apollo 
and Dionysus are not just some sort of abstract concepts. On the contrary, they 
represent metaphysical drives connected to and expressing the kernel of natural life 
itself9. Hence, Representations and Will are not just two ways of looking at the world 
as in Schopenhauer. In turn, they are two sorts of striving, one directed toward 
individuation and the other toward indistinction and primordial unity in the Will10. 
These strivings both have a metaphysical nature as they describe the essence of 
things, on one hand as they are individual and autonomous phenomena, and on the 
other hand as they are indistinct from one another by being expressions of the same 
reality. However, these two drives are at the same time ‘empirical’ insofar as they are 
actual powers rooted in nature and brought to the surface through human life. 
The following passage from section 7 of The Birth of Tragedy is of great 
interest as it shows how this duality of Apollo/Dionysus relates to our inquiry: 
The metaphysical consolation - with which, as I have already 
suggested here, all true tragedy leaves us - that life at the bottom of things, in 
spite of the passing of phenomena, remains indestructibly powerful and 
pleasurable, this consolation appears in embodied clarity in the chorus of 
satyrs, of creatures of nature who live on as it were ineradicably behind all 
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civilization and remain eternally the same in spite of the passing of 
generations and of the history of peoples11. 
In this excerpt, we see once again how metaphysics is linked to and 
expressed in the context of artistic practice. Specifically, we see how metaphysical 
knowledge can produce a change in our attitude toward existence. To see and come 
to know the eternal Will that underlies all phenomena embodied in the tragic chorus, 
is something that consoles us. In spite of the inhumanity of Dionysus and Apollo's 
vacuity, the satyrs endure through time, showing us how phenomena endure 
eternally inasmuch as they are part of the undying Will. Hence, assuming 
Nietzsche’s appreciation of Greek tragedy, it emerges from this passage how 
Nietzsche is not hostile to supplement the knowledge of life with some sort of 
metaphysics; at least, he is not hostile to this operation as such.  
Crucially, we see here the natural character of metaphysics, or rather how in 
Nietzsche's account metaphysics does not stand opposed to what is natural. This, 
follows insofar as metaphysical insight is produced and embodied in art. However, 
tragic art is the birth child of the marriage between the two natural drives symbolized 
in Apollo and Dionysus. Thus, what at first might seem to be the unnatural par 
excellence, that is, the artifices and fictions of art, are instead a manifestation of 
nature's might12. Art, a defining human activity and the highest human task according 
to Nietzsche himself, does not tear us apart from nature, but rather is what let us see 
into nature's essence as this is art’s essence too13. However, this does not mean 
that we have to stop thinking about metaphysics as the inquiry into what stands 
beyond nature.  
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I hold that in Nietzsche's account it is possible to understand this beyondness 
as a matter of positioning. Figuratively speaking, by looking at the tragic chorus we 
can contemplate for a moment the game that Will plays as something standing in 
front of us, that we can hold as a whole in the tragic representations and upon which 
we can reflect. In this we do metaphysics beyond nature, or rather from beyond 
nature, as we come to see it as a whole, in its internal struggle and dynamics.  
However, what is not possible to do in Nietzsche's account of metaphysics is to think 
that there is an absolute divide between the natural and the supernatural. As a 
spectator of a Greek tragedy, and as a metaphysical enquirer in general, I am still a 
natural creature and I am manifesting nature itself in meditating about nature beyond 
nature itself. The supernaturality of metaphysics can be produced and sustained only 
in connection with the naturality of the forces which make it possible. 
Tragic art, the product of the meeting of Apollo and Dionysus, is then able to 
grant us through the figure of the chorus a symbolical knowledge of the Ur-eine, the 
noumenal Schopenhauerian Will. This way, we come to see the fallaciousness of 
believing in self-standing representations, while at the same time we find consolation 
in learning about the true nature of our existential condition14. Crucially, as one would 
in fact expect from Nietzsche, the metaphysical consolation art provides us with is 
not described as some sort of 'life-denying delusion'. Rather, art's consolatory faculty 
is precisely the reason why Nietzsche held in such high esteem tragedy. Art, is ‘[…] 
a metaphysical supplement to the reality of nature, set alongside it for the purpose of 
overcoming it [...]'15. The key terms here are ‘alongside’ and ‘overcoming’: art is 
alongside nature and thus does not hide it from us, giving us the strength to  
overcome it rather than denying its mercilessness in continuously creating and 
destroying individual phenomena.  
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Tragedy might well be an illusion, nonetheless it is a good one insofar as it 
shows but at the same time filters the Schopenhauerian core of reality. If the 
individual was to be left on its own before the vision of the Ur-eine, it would be 
paralyzed by realizing how individuality is an illusory and frail condition. However, in 
this moment of danger art steps in, introducing its dynamics and symbols16. As 
mentioned in the excerpt above, the tragic chorus stands as what allows us to see 
the conjunction of Will and phenomena, and how the former endures indestructible 
beyond the caducity of the latter.  This protection, this screen between us and the 
Will, is the only thing that allows us not just to bear life but also have an affirmative 
stance toward it on the ground of the metaphysical consolation it grants17.  
Therefore, we can see two distinct albeit related aspects of Nietzsche's 
account of metaphysics. On one hand, metaphysics is an activity, something we do 
as a consequence of our vital drives. In this regard, art can produce metaphysical 
knowledge, and thus is a metaphysical activity only insofar as it is an expression of 
what animates human life18. On the other hand, metaphysics is a supplement to our 
understanding, an insight into the nature of reality. Hence, art is not just what 
produces metaphysical knowledge among the members of the audience: art 
represents existence while highlighting what its real nature is. Art itself is 
metaphysics and metaphysical knowledge. These two perspectives are conjoined: 
we express ourselves in metaphysical activities on the ground of a metaphysical 
framework that we seek to explore, express, and alter19. What emerges is then a 
notion of metaphysics as a particular articulation of these two elements, that is, as 
Nietzsche find them expressed in Greek tragedy and to which he looks favourably.  
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Which Metaphysics? (2) 
 
In the previous section I determined that in the early stages of his work, 
Nietzsche's relationship with metaphysics is less conflictual than normally imagined. 
The evaluation he gives of metaphysics is ambiguous, and depends on which sort of 
metaphysics is the object of judgment. At least when it comes in the fashion of tragic 
art, the work of metaphysics even assumes a positive aspect. It is now important to 
dig deeper in Nietzsche's conception of tragic art. Given the picture of art as the true 
and foremost metaphysical activity, to explore Nietzsche's understanding of tragic art 
shall enable us to further elucidate his stance toward metaphysics in BT. As 
mentioned above, these claims concerning art draw on the Wagnerian ideas 
influencing BT. Thus, in order to explore this topic, I shall put Schopenhauer in the 
background, and instead consider the issue of Nietzsche's account of art and 
metaphysics from the angle of Wagner's influence on BT.  
According to Wagner, true art is that which can bring together the arts of 
dance, tone, and poetry: this three collectively constitutes the 'Art-Work', the full 
expression of our artistic faculties. The latter are according to Wagner that which is 
the worthiest among human abilities, as they recapitulate and bring to expression our 
very essence. We can witness this kind of fully accomplished art in the Greek lyric 
and in its conscious completion, drama. Moreover, according to Wagner’s own self-
understanding, the meaning of his work is precisely that of reinstating the 'Art-Work' 
in modern times20. Attic tragedy and Wagnerian opera are then both examples of 
true art, as they bring forth the whole of humanity's essence as artistically expressed. 
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One of the aspects of BT  where we can see the impact of these ideas, is in 
the characterisation of the polarity of drives that comes to define the deep essence 
of Greek tragedy. Apollo and Dionysus each represents a number of art forms, 
plastic arts and music respectively21, and both of them need the other as a 
complement. In this respect, the underlying Will presented by Dionysiac music 
requires a 'semblance' in order to be expressed. Hence, the Greeks through plastic 
arts shaped an individuated image of the Will in the tragic chorus, thereby providing 
such a semblance. At the same time, the latter is just a deception since Will always 
remains one in many manifestations, in spite of the plurality of satyrs representing it 
in the tragic chorus. Accordingly, Apollo needs the presence of Dionysus, in order 
not to forget the illusory nature of representations, but Dionysus needs Apollo in 
order to be able to fully come to light22.  
Just like in the case of Wagner's 'artistic trinity', the condition of perfect 
balance between the two deities is accomplished in the Greek world; specifically, it is 
reached with the development of Attic tragedy after passages through Homeric epic 
and Archilochean poetry23. Following Wagner, Nietzsche regards Greek tragedy as 
the highest form of art as it includes the presence of these two deities and thus of the 
whole galaxy of human artistic expressions. What Nietzsche gives in BT  is his own 
personalized account of what the Art-Work is, as well as of its metaphysical 
significance. This, is made on the presupposition that our artistic faculties can 
express the nature of the essence of reality, and that they need to be brought 
together in order to obtain a picture of this reality which is also beneficial to us.  
Thus, Nietzsche follows Wagner in assuming that the highest art is the result 
of the  completion and balancing of all human's expressive capacities. Also, he 
agrees in seeing an example of this art in Greek tragedy. However, parallels and 
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common conclusions amount to more than this. In both thinkers we find an instance 
of the metaphysical empiricism discussed above: dance, tone, and poetry are not 
randomly selected by Wagner as the highest among arts. Instead, they represent the 
fruits of humanity's main three artistic faculties, with the latter term having a quite 
bodily meaning24. Similarly, Apollo and Dionysus are the symbolic forms of two vital 
drives, springing out of nature, and therefore human nature, itself25. For both the 
German authors then, metaphysics has a strong connection to nature, and no 
absolute divide can be traced between the natural and the super-natural. 
This means, that in both cases the metaphysical import of art is not in 
opposition to or detached from life: on the contrary, tragic art presents us with the 
vision of the fullness of our being as artistically expressed26. As Wagner puts it, an 
artist can produce an Art-Work just by entering into 'open life'27. by embracing Will 
and thus the whole of life's multi-sidedness. Furthermore, art is not practiced for its 
own sake, but for life's sake itself, that is, in order to both express its nature as well 
as to allow us to preserve an affirmative stance toward it28. Therefore, the artistic life 
is a life conscious of and affirming its own nature.  
Ultimately, this is the key to Nietzsche's understanding of metaphysics,  
namely what sort of life each singular metaphysics instantiates. This, as we shall see 
in the continuation of the paper, is what determines the ambiguity in Nietzsche's 
consideration of metaphysics, as well as what allows him to choose metaphysics as 
expressed in tragic art over other alternatives. What is at stake is not so much the 
accuracy or coherence of a metaphysical account of reality, but rather which sort of 
values, which sort of existence and attitude toward life are the basis and goal of a 
particular metaphysics. As Gianni Vattimo puts it, what matters to Nietzsche when it 
comes knowledge is not our notion's adequacy to a given structure. In turn, what 
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Nietzsche is concerned about, is the cohesive force and the ability to exist which 
underlie knowledge, that is, whether or not knowledge is supported and at the same 
time helps foster a life-affirming existential attitude29. 
 
Whose Metaphysics? 
 
In the previous section we saw that, according to Wagner, true art comes as 
an expression of life at its fullest. Accordingly, this is possible only if certain 
conditions are met: not just any form-of-life is capable of producing true art, insofar 
as we do not necessarily express existence in its full potential30.  In this, Wagner is 
influenced by Schopenhauer, expecially as he conceives art as the product of our 
Anschaungsvermögen. This concept designates both the human drive to create art, 
as well as the intuitive faculty that allows us to grasp the metaphysical Ur-eine31. An 
existence capable of producing true art is one which cultivates and exercises this 
faculty. Nietzsche himself agrees with this view, although he eventually sides with 
Wagner contra Schopenhauer, as to how he develops his thought in conjunction to 
this view. He accepts the Schopenhauerian Anschaung as the source of 
metaphysical knowledge32. Nonetheless, he follows Wagner in denying 
Schopenhauer's ensuing pessimism, in turn seeking to develop an affirmative and 
artistic ethic33. In other words, both Wagner and Nietzsche oppose Schopenhauer's 
conclusion that to grasp will as the Ur-eine must necessarily result in a pessimistic 
worldview. 
If true art must be supported and expressed by a certain kind of existence, 
and art is our true metaphysical activity, then the worthiness of our metaphysics is 
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not just a matter of conceptual accuracy. Our metaphysics is the framework of our 
form-of-life, and the truth of the former is dependant on the truth of the latter, where 
a higher level of truth equates to a fuller realization of life’s capacities. We can tell 
who we are and which forces drive us by the art, and therefore the metaphysics, that 
we express through our form-of-life. Accordingly, any particular metaphysics ought to 
be judged according to the truth of the values it expresses, that is, the maxims that 
support the degree of existential realization we attained. Of course, Nietzsche places 
a tragic understanding of life as that expressing the most ‘truthful’ of values34. In 
other words, tragic metaphysics portrays life as an expression of the Will without 
flowing into pessimism as a result. However, such a metaphysics is possible only as 
a result of our existential inclination to seek and accept its truth35. Thus, tragic art 
can only be the expression of an individual who already lives out the highest of 
value, and has developed strong and affirmative character, which is aware of life's 
nature but willing to accept it.  
Of course, this means that different characters can lead to different 
metaphysics,grounded on metaphysical activities other than art. Once more, this is 
asserted in particular in Nietzsche's own considerations in the beginning of BT: the 
moment Nietzsche enthrones art, he does that at the expense of (the philosophical, 
scientific discussion of) morality, implicitly understood as a lesser form of 
metaphysical activity36. A systematic overlooking of the significance of the opposition 
between art and morality is what has generated the absolute dichotomy between 
Nietzschean philosophy and metaphysics. The forgetfulness of Nietzsche's positive 
opinion of metaphysics as art, eventually resulted in the conflation of morality with 
metaphysics, privileging an impoverished understanding of the latter term37.  
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Morality, later in BT to be coupled with science, is indeed metaphysics just as 
art is, apart from the crucial fact that it is pursued and sustained by a form of 
existence very different from the tragic and artistic one. Notoriously, Nietzsche labels 
this approach to life as 'Socratism’ after its creator and prime practitioner. 
Nietzsche's issue with Socratism is that its offspring is a metaphysics which aims to 
be all-encompassing in its explanation of reality, but which cannot express what life 
truly is because of its premises.  
In this regard, Socratism as a metaphysics is an attempt to develop a purely 
rational strategy for dealing with life's painful and irrational side. However, this task is 
accomplished through exclusion, as existence is addressed only in respect to what 
intelligible there is in it. Accordingly, the Socratic thinker excludes the irrational and 
the unreasonable refusing to acknowledge it as a necessary part of existence. 
Morality-science as a metaphysical activity operates on the ground of the principle 
that '[…] 
knowledge is virtue; sin is the result of ignorance; the virtuous man is the happy man[
…]'38. Accordingly, the goal of this attitude toward existence is '[…] to make existence 
appear intelligible and so justified […]'39, to redeem existence from its apparent 
meaninglessness and imperscrutability.  
This implies that the Socratic principle is grounded on the premise that 
everything is in principle intelligible. If something was not understandable, the 
foundations of the happiness of the Socratic person would be eroded and destroyed. 
A force like Will that cannot be reduced to any standard of human rationality would 
put into question the truthfulness of the otherwise reasonable picture of the universe 
he holds dear. In so doing Socratism ends up just hiding but not overcoming pain, as 
it prevents himself to see and deal with the Will as the heart of reality40. Following 
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Pasqualotto, we might see the danger posed by Socratism as that of simplification: 
reality is reduced in its richness in order to fit some conceptual prejudice.  
Furthermore, this process of simplification does not affect just the ‘objective world’. 
To see that everything is an expression of the Will includes gaining an insight in our 
own subjectivity as one of these manifestations. Subsequently, to impoverish our 
understanding of the world by excluding Will from our sight means to impoverish our 
understanding of ourselves as well41. 
Subsequently, the self-imposed metaphysical blindness of the Socratic 
individual results in the killing of tragedy as he accuses it of being nothing but an 
illusion. In his view Apollo and Dionysus are nothing but the faces of an obscurantist 
mythology: they hide the truth of life's rationality with their unreasonableness. In this 
though, Socratism fails to recognize that tragedy is a somewhat honest illusion. As 
mentioned above, tragic art neither denies pain nor hides the truth about existence, 
but rather presents it in the shape of the satyrs of Greek tragedy. Thus, tragedy does 
not block us from seeing the truth, but rather allows us to live on in spite of knowing 
it. Tragedy is then an illusory symbolization, which through its stories and characters 
gives us insight in the metaphysics of reality as well as an interpretation of it42. On 
the contrary, the Socratic person acts on the optimistic assumption of the 
explicability of everything, according to the moral presupposition that it is possible to 
make sense of every aspect of life. This way, the Socratic enquirer creates the worst 
of mystifications: a metaphysics which is metaphysically blind. In other words, 
Socratism endeavours to explain pain, trying to rationalize Will and not 
acknowledging its irreducibility to human standards. As there is no place for 
unreasonableness43 in the moral-scientific and Socratic view of life, there is no room 
for the Will44: as a result, life's nature is falsified and covered.   
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Once more, Socratism as metaphysics is metaphysically unaware, and this 
makes morality, Socratism's defining metaphysical activity, deficient. In this respect, 
morality and Socratism are the expressions of a vital drive analogous to those which 
give birth to the figures of Apollo and Dionysus, as they are both connected to the 
metaphysical inquiry into the nature of things. Still, the Socratic worldview fails in 
seeing its dependency and connections to these drives, and thus fails to see its 
connection to life and its irrational kernel45. According to Nietzsche, this mindset is 
the result of a pathology, as it gives too much merit to appearances while it excludes 
the Will from its view, making the former absolute and arranging them in a rational 
but insincere way. Socratism is then made of the same substance of the drives 
which inspire tragedy insofar as it is an expression of life, but, in both a literal and a 
metaphysical sense, it is the result of a sick form of this substance – it presents a 
metaphysical view of reality, just like art, but at the same time causes life to retreat 
within the safe walls of reasonableness, as by contrast art pushes the person to 
transcend them46.  
In some respect, we can see here one of the seeds of Nietzsche’s later 
intuitions, and I believe there is no harm in employing them to elucidate this point. 
For example, in Beyond Good and Evil (from here on BGE), morality is described as 
a perspective which produces a narrowing of one’s own horizon. Morality, far from 
telling the truth about the world, is simply an expression of good faith toward the 
moral view of a particular group. Therefore, all that moralists do is in fact to argue in 
favour of a perspective which is grounded on their own prejudice and seeks secretly 
to confirm them47.  
It is clear then, how different persons can live by different and competing 
metaphysics. It is also clear why according to Nietzsche the assessment of different 
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metaphysical frameworks cannot be led on the ground of their accuracy. Such thing 
is impossible insofar as to be a Socratist implies a world-view which simply excludes 
that of tragedy, insofar as their presuppositions and values are alien to one another. 
The tragic and the theoretic perspectives on life are then bound to be conflictual. 
Such a battle can come to an end only when science is eventually shown in its futility 
and blindness48, something that according to Nietzsche happened with the thought of 
Kant and Schopenhauer49.  
Therefore, different metaphysics must be scrutinized in terms of the existential 
attitude they represent, and whose sustenance they promote. Hence, in the context 
of The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche's supposed absolute opposition to metaphysics 
can only be accepted with a number of qualifications. Rather, we can accept that he 
was ready to embrace and to oppose metaphysics each time according to what 
metaphysics represented in that context. I  shall now move to Nietzsche's later self-
criticism of his first work. We will then see what he makes of metaphysics by that 
time. 
The Wisdom of Dionysus 
I shall now turn my attention to Nietzsche’s retrospective comments on BT. 
Specifically, I shall focus on the preface to the second edition of BT, as well as on 
the pages from Ecce Homo concerning Nietzsche’s first book. Once again, it is 
significant to observe the meaning of the word metaphysics in these contexts. The 
term metaphysics occurs four times in the preface to the second edition of The Birth 
of Tragedy, published in 1886 under the title An Attempt at Self-Criticism. On each 
occasion, Nietzsche employs the expression ‘artistic metaphysics’, and seems to 
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understand this according to a definition of metaphysics consistent with the one we 
find in the text's main body.  
Let us consider the first instance in particular. Here, we find a reference to an 
artistic metaphysics, presumably implying that the young Nietzsche’s understanding 
of the essence of things was influenced by art and his conception of it. This 
metaphysics, lies in the background of the author’s attempt of explaining science 
'[…] through the optic of the artist, and art through the optic of life'50. Hence, even at 
this late stage does Nietzsche understand his earlier work as being concerned with 
metaphysics. 
The other three instances in which this term is employed all express a similar 
notion. In the first of these, Nietzsche discusses the vision of Will as the ground of 
being in terms of the product of an artistic metaphysics. While the latter may now in 
retrospect seem idle and arbitrary, Nietzsche nonetheless hails it as the beginning of 
a quest for a ‘pessimism beyond good and evil’51. Crucially for our inquiry, what 
Nietzsche criticizes of his younger self is his own immaturity, and not his 
engagement with metaphysics. Along the same line, metaphysics is referenced two 
more times in the last section of the preface, where Nietzsche is busy discharging 
himself from an accusation of Romanticism.  
Notably, even though the word metaphysics is here employed according to 
the same meaning as before, we find the return of the axiological ambiguity of this 
term. While in the previous passage Nietzsche acknowledged in his early 
metaphysics the ground of his later thought, now he repels his youthful ideas 
because of their link to the consoling effect of Attic tragedy. Nietzsche seems to have 
come to the point of refusing firmly any idea of metaphysical consolation. In other 
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words, he now rejects the idea that while we need to know the truth concerning 
reality, we also need to be 'sheltered' from it in order not to be crushed by the 
discovery of Will as the kernel of reality. Accordingly, his whole artistic metaphysics 
is now very expressively '[…] sent to the devil […]', together with the whole idea of 
Apollo consoling us and making existence bearable: Zarathustra laughs as the 
procession passes by52. 
We see how the preface follows the same lines of thought of the original text, 
though applying the same reasoning to different targets. In other words, it is now the 
idea of tragic consolation which seems to be inadequate when it comes to convey a 
true life-affirming attitude. If The Birth of Tragedy preached against the self-
sufficiency of phenomena in order to institute a ‘non-idolatrous’ cult of Apollo by 
exposing Will as the ground of nature53, Nietzsche now thinks this position to be not 
just under-developed, but philosophically deluded as well. This is particularly evident 
in the Ecce Homo’s passages devoted to the duality of Apollo and Dionysus. Here 
Nietzsche openly attacks this concept as a crypto-Hegelian idea ruling over the 
course of history. Moreover, he brands the same with the here clearly negative label 
of metaphysics54. Thus, as of 1888 and just before his eventual psychological 
collapse, we can see how Nietzsche chastised some of his own early positions in the 
same way he did with ‘Socratism’. These too are now nothing but expressions of 
dogmatic and one-sided blindness, and thus obstacles to the necessary self-
overcoming of humanity. However, we might ask how these criticisms square with 
the appreciative comments about BT that we mentioned above, and in general with 
the positive employment of the term metaphysics on Nietzche’s part. 
According to Gregory Moore's reading of Nietzsche, Apollo and Dionysus 
symbolically represent two 'cosmic forces'55 which anticipate the vision of a broader 
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Will to Power operating in nature56. In this respect, both the early and the late 
Nietzsche are consistent in seeing a Bildungstrieb as the intertwining of the 
principium individuationis and of the underlying unity and continuous shattering of its 
products. This Trieb operates in the cosmos and shapes life toward higher forms of 
individuation, as well as in characterizing this drive as artistic in nature57. Therefore, 
in both stages we find the same idea: art, that is, the force which leads us into 
forging our metaphysical framework, is also something which grows out of the very 
essence of life. At no stage of the development of Nietzsche's thought we find a 
discontinuity between life and metaphysics. What changes is the fact that Nietzsche 
comes to consider his earlier accounts as insufficient in order to serve his criticism of 
Socratism. He feels that some aspects of the ideas found in BT were dangerously 
close to Socratism themselves. In particular, the notion of a metaphysical 
consolation was in fact just another way of justifying the world in the face of its 
irrationality. As a matter of fact, Nietzsche moves against himself the same 
accusation that in the past he moved against his contemporaries in general, namely 
that of being excessively prone to simplification58. Just as ‘Socratism’ was unaware 
of its artistic roots, the interplay between Apollo and Dionysus was first developed 
with a blind eye to the Will to Power.  
That being said, I argue that we should understand Nietzsche’s partial rebuttal 
of The Birth of Tragedy as a development of his former positions about metaphysics, 
rather than a tout court aggression. For sure his idiosyncrasies with the term have 
grown over the years: at this stage, metaphysics simply tends to be employed just in 
a negative way, often describing what falls into the cauldron of Platonic-Christian 
Ressentiment.  Nonetheless, we should not let a shift in terms of vocabulary mislead 
us. Once more, the problem for Nietzsche is not metaphysics as such, but the values 
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embodied by a particular metaphysics. This finds evidence in that, while Nietzsche 
rejects the metaphysics underlying the duality of Apollo and Dionysus, in his late 
philosophy art still enjoys a crucial role. However, art is now kept in high esteem 
because of its ability to teach us the courage of Amor Fati, and not for its consolatory 
capacities59. As Vattimo underlines commenting Nietzsche’s posthumous fragments, 
art is now where we see the ‘inside overflowing into the outside’, the strength of 
Dionysus disrupting continuously each form in which life attempts to crystallize 
itself60. Thus Amor Fati, the expression of our resolve to make this Dionysian 
abundance of strength the ground of our stance toward life, is the product of a 
healthy metaphysical understanding of life’s nature, namely the one we can get from 
art. A Socratic thinker has no use for Amor Fati, as he explains pain and negativity 
away, developing a metaphysics of blindness. 
Therefore, the role of art does not change over time, in terms of its 
contribution to Nietzsche's project of criticism of modern culture and revaluation of 
values. What changes is rather the understanding of art's content what in the late 
stages of his work Nietzsche calls the ‘Wisdom of Dionysus’, an expression he 
already employs in BT61. However, now this wisdom is not a source of consolation 
anymore, but rather of an attitude pushing toward the affirmative overcoming of 
oneself62. This wisdom, flows from a proper metaphysical understanding of life, 
which is now finally unbounded by any suspect metaphysical duality. Hence, I hold 
that it is not too daring to see in this wisdom a new ‘unblinded metaphysics’ that the 
author resorts to herald in his 1880’s writings, and which also springs from the Will, 
now conceived as Will-to-Power. If now the tension of Apollo and Dionysus falls in 
the field of ‘Socratism’, we can still see in the satyrs' chorus an anticipation of 
Nietzsche's later themes as he himself acknowledges toward the end of the Attempt 
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to Self-Criticism63. Simply, the affirmation of existence now takes place without any 
reference to some metaphysical framework smelling of Socrates or even Hegel, but 
rather in the drive of the Will to Power64.  
Conclusion 
I have argued how, through an examination of some of Nietzsche's early and 
late works, it is possible to question the assumption that he was completely opposed 
to metaphysics. As a conclusion, although my inquiry has been somewhat brief and 
covered but a small part of Nietzsche’s work relevant to the present topic, I would 
now point out some aspects underlying the evolution of Nietzsche’s thought. 
On one hand, we see that in the late stages of his work Nietzsche came to 
refuse some of his youthful positions on topics such as the nature of art. As a result 
of this, he sees his early positive tones regarding metaphysics with an eye of 
suspicion. Consequently, Nietzsche comes to refusing any notion of metaphysical 
consolation as a positive status produced by tragedy. Nontheless, if the tension 
between Apollo and Dionysus falls into the background, nonetheless the spirit of the 
latter lives on in Zarathustra. The god of tragedy, who still represents the 
metaphysical insight into the tumultuous essence of life, carves the path for 
Nietzsche's late reflections. 
In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche acknowledges how his first book initiated his 
criticism of Socratism, as well as his quest for reviving ‘Dionysian wisdom’. The latter 
concept is then retroactively projected and rooted into BT, therefore establishing a 
connection between the early and the late Nietzsche’s Dionysus. Dionysian Wisdom 
results in Amor Fati, the Stimmung of the late Nietzsche's ethic of self-overcoming, 
but by tracing this connection to BT, Nietzsche clearly sees the source of this feeling 
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in the same Ur-eine of BT. Thus, Amor Fati comes from our consciousness of Will as 
the essence of reality, in this substituting the earlier metaphysical consolation. This 
means that art and its god remain the privileged source of metaphysical knowledge, 
as well as the only proper inspirer of a life-affirming attitude65. 
Insofar as he continues to reflect upon the Dionysian drive, Nietzsche is 
definitively a metaphysical thinker, although he promotes a style of metaphysics in 
contrast to what he considers to be the Socratic or Christian-Platonic one. Hence, 
even at the end of his career, Nietzsche’s criticisms were not aimed at some abstract 
notion of metaphysics. Rather, his attacks were aimed at the cultural forms which 
presented an obstacle to our appraisal of Dionysian wisdom, namely the 
understanding of Will as pervading and giving birth to reality. 
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